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Abstract
Thispaper showsthatunderrather mildconditions,highercapitalincome taxesleadto
faster growth in an overlapping generations economy with endogenous growth. Govern-
ment expenditures are ﬁnanced with labor income taxes as well as capital income taxes.
Since capital income accrues to the old, taxing it reliefs the tax burden on the young and
leaves them withmore income outof whichtosave. We argue thatsavingsare sufﬁciently
interest inelastic so that higher savings and therefore higher growth result. The basic
argument is not seriously challenged by a grandfather clause for initial capital or by the
old receiving some labor income as well.
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1 Introduction
Most economists, when asked about their deep beliefs, would probably agree that a low or
zero capital income tax is desirable, at least for efﬁciency reasons, see e.g. Chamley (1986)
or Lucas (1990). An often-heard argument runs that a low capital income tax increases the
private return to capital, thus encouraging investment and growth1.
However, this is not necessarily so. This argument implicitely assumes that the capital
income tax can be lowered costlessly. A government, however, is faced with tradeoffs: lower
capital income taxation means either lower government expenditures or higher debt ﬁnancing
or higher labor income taxes2. Keep the level of government expenditure and debt ﬁnancing
ﬁxed for the sake of the argument. If we think of labor income being paid mostly to the young
and capital income accruing mostly to the old, a lower capital income tax and thus a higher
labor income tax means that the younger people in an economy are left with less income out
of which to save and to buy the capital stock. If savings decisions are not too elastic with
respect to long term interest rates, this will lead to lower savings and thereby to slower growth
rather than faster growth. The issue becomes clearer when thinking about lump-sum taxes
instead: if a given amount of revenue has to be raised, taxing the old rather than the young will
lead to faster growth, since agents compensate for the tax shift through higher savings. With
proportional taxes, the question simply is whether the substitution effect on savings through
lower interest rates is enough to undo the growth effect of the tax-burden shift towards the old.
We argue that measured savings elasticities are indeed low enough for the described effect to
take place. We therefore claim that higher capital income taxation means faster growth. Note,
that the effect on welfarewill be ambiguous in general, since the intially old will alwaysprefer
less to more capital income taxation and the generations in the far distant future will always
prefer faster growth: we therefore focus on the positive analysis only.
Growth is about the long term and thereby necessarily about the tradeoff between
generations3. Thus, to demonstrate our claim, we will consider a fairlystandard, deterministic
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, where the productivity-augmented
labor input contains an externality term which relates to aggregate capital. We show the
robustness of our claim to three possible objections. Related arguments have been brought
1There are also two arguments in favor of capital income taxation. The ﬁrst stresses its progressivity and
the tradeoff between some kind of “fair” income distribution and efﬁciency. The second argues, that it may be
sensible to highly tax capital already in place, since it as a ﬁxed factor, but tax capital little or not at all in the
more distant future, see Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1991). Obviously, the issue of time consistency is not trivial
here, see Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1989)
2This argument in turn, of course, ignores Laffer curve type effects, see Sargent (1987). The experience with
Reagonomics indicates, however, that this may not be a worrisome issue to ignore.
3Unless, of course, one believes in inﬁnitely lived dynasties linked by bequests, see Barro (1974), Kotlikoff
and Summers (1979), Abel and Bernheim (1991) and the related literature.2
forward by Feldstein (1978) in a two-period model, Auerbach (1979) in an overlapping gen-
erations economy with neoclassical growth and in particular Jones and Manuelli (1992), who
also consider an overlapping generations economy with endogeneous growth. By using an
externality-driven AK model4 here rather than a concave production function as in the tax
analysis in Jones and Manuelli, the growth effects are immediate rather than asymptotic and
transfers to the young are not necessary for sustainable growth. In addition to their paper
we show that reversing our claim often requires negative savings, see section 4.3. Thus we
show that most reasonable speciﬁcations will result in the claimed effect. In contrast to Auer-
bach (1979),theendogeneousgrowthstructureheresimpliﬁesas wellasampliﬁestheanalysis:
heuristically, the economy is always in the ﬁrst period of the transition phase to a new steady
stateof acomparableneoclassical growthmodel. Thus, theeffectonthecapital stock isgreater
and no intricate transitional dynamics need to be considered. The engine of growth has been
chosen to be particularly simple in order to concentrate on the taxation issue at hand.
The assumption of ﬁnite lifetimes is crucial for our model and gives rise to the striking
contrast with the inﬁnite-horizon results. Bertola (1994) provides for an elegant comparison
by analyzing the intermediate case of exponentially distributed lifetimes. He shows that our
analysis can survive in such a model as well, provided for example, that labor supplied by an
individualdeclines sufﬁcientlyquicklyover itslifetime,i.e. that thereisa needto save inorder
to provide for retirement.
The second section introduces the model. The third section demonstrates our claim for
interest inelastic, logarithmic utilities. We then examine three possible objections against that
claim in theforth section of the paper and arguethat none of these objections is seriousenough
to undo our claim. The ﬁrst objection concerns the potential effect of positively interest elastic
savings. We argue, that savings decisions are sufﬁciently interest inelastic in the US economy
for our effect to hold. The second objection raises the issue of a grandfather clause for initial
capital. We show, that even then our claim holds, as long as the labor income tax is lowered
only in those periods in which additional revenue from higher capital income taxes is created.
The third objection asks whether possible labor income of the old could undo our result. We
show, that the parameter ranges which reverse our claim are either extreme or fragile. We thus
conclude in the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section, that a higher capital income tax leads indeed to faster
growth.
2 The Model
A new generation of agents is born every period. Agents live two periods. There is no
population growth and that there is one representative agent per generation. When young, the
4The term AK model refers to equation (3).3
agent is endowed with 0 <1units of time and when old, his or her time endowment is
1 − . There is one consumption good per period and an agent born in period t is assumed to
enjoy consumption according to the utility function
u(cy;t;co;t+1);
where cy;t  0 is the consumption when young and co;t+1  0 is the consumption when old.
We assume that u is homothetic and satisﬁes the usual list of conditions. In particular then,
there is a continuously differentiable consumption rule C(R) for R>0 , so that the utility





is uniquely maximized at consumption
cy;t = C(R)W
for any value of the endowment W>0in terms of consumption at date t and any (after-tax)




)W =( 1−C( R ))Wy − C(R)Wo=R; (1)
where Wy is the value of the time endowment in consumption goods when young, Wo is the
value of the time endowment in consumption goods when old and W = Wy + Wo=R is the
total endowment in terms of present consumption. The agents supply their time endowment
inelastically as labor, so that the total labor supply per period is unity5. Below, it will turn
out, that wages when young per unit of time are given by w(Kt=) for some factors w and ,
growingatsomerateg−1perperiod. WecanthenusetheformulasabovewithWy = wKt=
and Wo = g(1 − )wKt=.
Therearemanycompetingﬁrmsinthiseconomy. Theproductionfunctionfortheindividual








where ki;t is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, ni;t is the labor hired by that ﬁrm and Kt =
P
ki;t is the
aggregatecapital stock. The capital share is given by0 <<1 . The labor input is augmented
by the factor Kt=, which generates a simple externality of the kind often used in theories
of endogenous growth, see e.g. Romer (1986) or Grossman and Helpman (1991). Since all
ﬁrms will have the same capital-labor ratio in equilibrium, dividends accruing to the holders
5We could assume a preference for leisure as well in the utility function. This would only strengthen our
argument, since a lower labor income tax will mean less distortion in the labor market on top of simply leaving
more income after taxes.4
of all capital in ﬁrm i are given by dki;t = yi;t, whereas labor income paid to ni;t will equal
wni;t =( 1− ) y i;t. Aggregating, we ﬁnd that total production is given by
Yt = aKt; (3)
where a = −1: a high value for a means a large spillover effect and thus higher output6.





independently of t. Wages per unit of time are likewise given by (1 − )Yt, so that the wage
rate wt per efﬁciency unit of labor, nt = =Kt,i sg i v e nb y
w t=( 1− ) 
; (5)
which is again independent of t. We will therefore omit the time index for wt and dt below.
We assume that capital depreciates at some rate 0    1 and that output each period
can be split into private consumption Ct, government consumption Ht and investment Xt to
capital:
Ct + Ht + Xt = Yt: (6)
The capital stock thus evolves according to
Kt+1 =( 1− ) K t+X t; (7)
w h e r ew ea l l o wX tto be negative for simplicity. The total value of a unit of old capital at the
beginning of period t in terms of the present consumption good is now given by
v = d +( 1−)=a +1−: (8)
Note that v is also the total return to a purchase of a unit of capital at t-1.
Finally, we introduce the government which has to ﬁnance a given stream of expenditures
Ht. Rather than ﬁxing the level of these expenditures beforehand irrespective of the growth
rate, we assume that thegovernment wantsor needs to spend a certain fractionγ of total output
each period7:
Ht = γYt: (9)
6Note that we normalized the aggregate labor supply N to equal unity. Without this normalization, we would
have a =( N=)1− and all calculations below still go through with the proper accounting for distinguishing
individual from aggregate variables. The important point is that the constant a still is the aggregate output to
aggregate physical capital ratio.
7One may imagine in some richer model, that government expenditures are another factor in producing
ﬁnal services and that for certain speciﬁcations of such a production function, it is optimal to keep the ratio of
government services and/or government capital to private capital constant. As an example, it certainly makes
sense that a richer country would want to build a better road system than a poorer country. In any case, our
assumption seems to ﬁt well with actual government behaviour, based on casual empiricism.5
We allowthereto be threesourcesof government revenue: capital incometaxes, taxes on labor
income and government debt.
Let K;0 be the capital income tax rate in the ﬁrst period t =0and K be the tax rate for
all periods after that. The distinction between the ﬁrst period and all other periods will be
important later for discussing grandfather clauses. Let L;t be the tax rate on labor income,
which may depend on t. Below, we will restrict ourselves to equilibria, where we need to
distinguish only between tax rates L;0 for t =0and L  L;t for all t  1. For formal
simplicity, capital income taxes are to be paid on the full amount of capital income, including
the resale value of the capital and not just the capital gains8 and we assume that all savings are
ﬁnanced out of after-tax labor income. Thus, there usually will be double-taxation of savings.
This is simply a matter of accounting and notation9: it is irrelevant for the individual agent,
whether his or her savings are taxed twice or simply once at the appropriate sum of the two
rates and similarly, the capital income tax here can equivalently be rewritten as a (larger) tax
on the net capital income only. All that matters for the individual is the tradeoff between
consuming when young and consuming when old. With linear tax schedules, this tradeoff is
constant and can be characterized by a relative price between the two relevant consumption
goods, independently of the level of consumption.
Thus, the relevant relative price of the consumption good when young in terms of the
consumption good when old is the private total return on capital or the after-tax interest factor
on savings. It is given by
R =( 1− K) v=( 1− K)(a +1−) (10)
and independent of t. The after-tax interest rate per period isr = R − 1.
Finally, let b be the ratio of new one-period government debt to output, which we assume
to be constant for all periods. Depending on the parameters, this means that either some part
of the debt is serviced and some part of the debt rolled over each period or that some new
debt is issued each period. We assume that the government is not initially indebted, so that
the total amount bY0 can be used in period 0 to ﬁnance government expenditures. Payments
on government debt are tax-free: this just simpliﬁes government budget accounting, since the
governmentwouldpayaswellasreceiveanysuch tax. Theinterestratepaid onthegovernment
debt has to equal the after-tax interest rate r = R − 1 on capital.
Let
gt = Kt=Kt−1 = Yt=Yt−1
8We assume limited liabilitythroughout. That means, that capital owners cannot be forced to pay more taxes
than their capital income and likewise, workers cannot be forced to pay more taxes than their labor income. This
puts some mild restrictions on γ
9Furthermore, even thoughactual tax codes seem to avoid double taxation, they are unsuccessful in doing so,
since in practice, taxable capital gains are often mostly nominal gains due to inﬂation. Thus, our notation may
not be far from describing tax practice.6
be one plus the growth rate from period t-1 to period t. The government budget constraint then
requires that
γY0 = K;0vK0 +L;0wK0= + bY0; (11)
in period t =0and







in all other periods t  1. Dividing these constraints by the capital stock and solving for the



























These two equations express the labor income tax as a function of the chosen capital income
tax rates K;0, K, the debt-output ratio b and the growth rate gt. These equations are the key
to our argument: a raise in the capital income tax rate means a fall in the labor tax rate, since
we keep the fraction of government expenditure γ unchanged. Note that in order for L to be
independent of the time-index t for t  1, it needs to be the case that either the government
chooses b =0or that the endogeneous growth rate gt − 1 is independent of t.
Market clearing on the capital market requires
bYt + Kt+1 = St;
where St is aggregate savings from period t to period t+1. Replacing aggregate savings by the
appropriate expression involving wages and the savings function, the capital market clearing












Solving this equation for gt+1 and making use of w= = a(1 − ) yields
gt+1 =









Thus, L;t is determined by equation (13) for t =0or by equation (14) and gt−1 for t  1.
Given L;t, the next growth rate gt+1 − 1 is calculated via equation (16). Thus, solving the
model means recursively determining labor tax rates and growth rates via equations (14) and
(16). In particular, if b =0 , it follows that gt  g for all t  2 and L;t  L for all t  1.
Alternatively, if K;0, K and b are chosen such that L;0 = L;1,w eh a v eg tgfor all t  1
and L;t  L for all t  0, i.e. all periods. These are the cases on which we will concentrate.7
3 Higher Capital Income Taxes Mean Faster Growth: The
Benchmark Case.
Consider in particular the debtless benchmark case, where b =0 , K= K;0 and where only








and equation (16) simpliﬁes to
g = a(1 − )(1 − L)S(R;1): (18)
The argument brought forward in the introduction can now formally be seen in equations (17),
(10) and (18): a higher capital income tax rate leads to a lower after-tax return R and a lower
labor income tax L. If the decrease in the labor income tax overcompensates the possible
decrease in the savings S(R;1), then a higher growth rate results.
As an example, consider the case, where the utility function for consumption is given by
u(cy;t;co;t+1)=l o g ( c y;t)+log(co;t+1): (19)





In this case, the only effect of a higher capital income tax is to lower the labor tax rate L,
thereby unambiguously increasing the growth rate g according to (18). In fact, the growth-rate
maximizing capital income tax rate in this environment is to tax away practically all income to
capital and use it to subsidize rather than tax labor income.
Likewise, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is some constant <1(or, equiva-
lently, the relative risk aversion is constant at 1= > 1), resulting in the utility function
u(cy;t;co;t+1)=
c









it is easy to see that the savings function is given by S(R;1)=x=(1+x); where x = R−1.
Now, S(R;1) is decreasing in R, so that an increase in capital income taxation leads to an
increase in growth even without the labor-income tradeoff, and certainly in our model as well.
Let us summarize the results of these examples in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the overall utility is characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of unity or lower,   1, then a higher capital incometax rate will unambiguously
result in a higher growth rate.8
It is interesting to note, that Hall (1988) has measured the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and concluded that its “value may even be zero and is probably not above .2”,
giving empirical credibility to the proposition above10.
4 Three Possible Objections.
At least three objections may be raised against the result above. The ﬁrst concerns the effect
of positively interest elastic savings: perhaps, the log-utility case is not sufﬁciently robust and
the effect may reverse for some reasonable intertemporal elasticity of substitution >1 ,s a y .
Secondly, the result may just come about, because we increase the tax rate on the capital stock
ownedbytheinitiallyold,anondistortionary,buttime-inconsistenttax. Istheresultoverturned
with a grandfather clause for initial capital? Finally, the old too earn labor income in the “real
world” but not in the benchmark case considered above - perhaps this will undo the argument.
We examine each of these objections below. We argue that none of them matters enough
and that therefore a higher capital income tax means faster growth.
4.1 Objection 1: The Interest Elasticity of Savings is Positive
Consider again the benchmark no-debt case where K;0 = K and b =0 . In general, the
direction of the marginal change in the growth rate due to a marginal change in the capital






at the after-tax interest factor of that equilibrium. E.g., for the constant intertemporalelasticity
of substitution utility function used above, we have
(R)=
−1
1+ R − 1: (21)
Thus, for   1, the elasticity is zero or negative, leading to the unambiguous result stated in
the previous section. If the elasticity is positive, however, the relative strength of each effect
- decreased savings due to a lower after-tax return or increased savings due to higher income
when young - matters. The following result obtains.
10In contrast to our result, Buiter (1991) ﬁnds   0:04 as the necessary conditionfor a higher capital income
tax to increase growth and concludes, that this bound is too low to be satisﬁed. The reason for the difference to
our analysis is that he considers a continuous-timeoverlapping generations model with exponentiallydistributed
lifetime, and very different other assumptions: in his model, agents are essentially always young. An elegant
reconciliation of his model with our model and further discussion is in Bertola (1994).9
Proposition 2 A marginally higher capital income tax leads to a marginally higher growth
rate across equilibria if and only if the interest elasticity of savings is not too big:
(R) <
R
a(1 − )(1 − L)
: (22)







which is simply the ratio of after-tax capital income to after-tax labor income in period t.
Proof:
Substituting(14)and(10)into(18),itfollowsinastraightforwardmanner, that@g=@K > 0
holds if and only if
S(R;1)
(1 − )a




Rewriting this inequality yields the result. 
In order to assess whether or not the claimed effect is relevant for actual economies, the
theory has to become quantitative. For the purpose here, it should be enough to simply
choose some rough numbers describing, say, the US economy to assess the importance of the
proposition. It is important to keep in mind in this calibration exercise, that the model is about
periods lasting half the life of a generation, for which we choose 30 years.
For  and L,  = :3 and L = :3 may be reasonable choices, so that, roughly,
(R) < 2R=a (23)
is necessary and sufﬁcient for the claimed effect. We now have to ﬁnd values for R and a. We
want to be somewhat conservative in these guesses, i.e. we should not overstate the interest
factor R and should not understate the spillover parameter a. It is well known, that long term
real rates are quite low, but positive, so that R =1is a good, conservatively low choice11.
The most difﬁcult parameter to calibrate is the parameter a. Christiano (1988) has found, that
K=Y =1 0 : 59 or Y=K =0 : 0944 on a quarterly basis. To translate that into a value for the
parameter a on a 30 year or 120 quarter basis as required by equation (3), the latter number
needs to be multiplied with 120, resulting in 11:33. To have a round number, we use a =1 2 .
Thus, if the elasticity of savings over long horizons like 30 years with respect to the after-
tax interest factor R over the same horizon is less than 1=6, a higher capital income tax on
these savings should lead to faster growth. E.g., for the constant intertemporal elasticity of
11Our argument is only strengthened by considering e.g. a yearly real after-tax interest rate of 1% rather than
0%. The compounded 30-year interest factor R then computes to R =1 : 35 rather than R =1 , which makes
quite a difference for the righthand side of (23) in favour of our argument.10
substitution utility functions used for the benchmark example, this inequality translates into
<1 : 333 (or 1= > :75 for the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion) at  =1 ,R=1via
equation (21). In order to state the required elasticity (R) < 1=6 more intuitively, it is a good
idea to annualize it: the elasticity 1(R1) of “retirement” savings with respect to the yearly
after-tax interest factor R1 = R1=30 on these savings must be less than 5 in order to get the
claimed effect. In other words, suppose the yearly interest rate on savings for retirement or
long-term purposes rises from 0% to 1%. As long as that doesn’t raise these savings by 5% or
more, taxing these savings more will lead to faster growth as claimed.
Most oftheempiricalworkstates savingselasticities(r1)withrespect totheyearlyinterest
rate r1 = R1 −1 rather than the elasticity 1(R1) with respect to the yearly interest factor R1.
For some ﬁxed r1 = R1 − 1, these elasticities translate into each other via




sothatforr1 = :04, say,aninterestfactorelasticityof5correspondstoan interestrateelasticity
of about 0.2. Translating estimated elasticities is moreproblematicdueto thestochastic nature
of interest rates and since real yearly interest rates are notoriously low.
Empirical estimates for the interest rate elasticity range from negative, insigniﬁcant or
trivially small (see e.g. Blinder (1975), (1981), Blinder and Deaton (1985), Bosworth and
Burtless (1992, Hall (1988) and Skinner and Feenberg (1990) ) to quite large: Boskin (1978)
found the elasticity to be around 0.4 (which Summers (1981) even considers to be low on
theoretical grounds). Thus, while the empirical evidence may not be as clear cut as one may
desire it to be, the authors personally side with the majorityof the empirical evidence pointing
tolowsavingsinterestrateelasticitiesandconcludethatthisﬁrstobjectionofpositivelyinterest
elastic savings is not a strong one.
4.2 Objection 2: Grandfather Clauses
The second objection one may raise is that the capital owned by the initial old is taxed in the
equilibriaconsideredabove. Sincethatcapital isaﬁxed factor,taxing itisnot distortionaryand
thus desirable from the point of view of efﬁciency. It thus may not surprise some readers that
increasing the tax rate on the initial capital stock can lead to faster growth and one may think
that our result hinges on that (compare also to Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), the discussion
of their paper by Stiglitz (1983 and the time-consistency issues raised in Chari, Kehoe and
Prescott (1989)). After all, taxing capital rather than labor means taxing the old rather than the
young, which means a shift in the timing of government revenue receipts. If the government
had to "grandfather in" rather than taxing the initial capital, it may need to issue debt in order
to ﬁnance the same expenditure with a tax revenue stream shifted to the future. The higher11
savings of the young will then be channelled into government debt rather than capital and the
overall effect may then be a decrease rather than an increase in the growth rate12.
This argument can indeed be veriﬁed within our framework for the benchmark log-utility
case:
Proposition 3 If theoverall utilityis given as a discounted sumof logarithmicutilityfunctions
of consumption in each period of life (see equation (19)), if only the young earn labor income,
if the initial capital income tax K;0 remains ﬁxed and if the same labor income tax L;0 =
L;t  L is chosen in all periods, then a higher capital incometax rate K will unambiguously
result in a lower rather than a higher growth rate.
Proof: Equation (16) implies that the constant growth rate g is given by




















and the debt level b is calculated via (13) as













rather than dg=dL > 0 as before. Similarly , substituting (27) into (26) yields, as usual,
dL=dK < 0:
Taking these two inequalities together delivers the claim. 
Debt lowersgrowthrates evenif it canbe rolledover forever13. However, it is not necessary
to issue debt. Alternatively, consider not lowering the labor income tax on the ﬁrst young
12This effect does not depend on whether savings are before taxes rather than after taxes, if the accounting is
done right, since the deferral of the payment of the taxes can be compensated for equivalently with debt equal
to the deferred taxes. I.e. before-taxes savings are increased by an amount which simply equals the discounted
deferred tax payments.
13The argument is similar to the discussion of bubbles in overlapping generations models with endogeneous
growth in Yanagawa and Grossman (1993)12
generation, but only lowering the labor income tax from the second period onwards, in which
thegovernment receives highercapital incometaxes as well. Thegovernment does not “cheat”
here, since the change in the tax plan is known beforehand to any generation which will be
affected by it14. In contrast to the proposition above and in accordance to our general claim
that increasing the capital income tax leads to faster growth, we have
Proposition 4 If theoverall utilityis given as a discounted sumof logarithmicutilityfunctions
of consumption in each period of life (see equation (19)), if only the young earn labor income,
if the initial capital income tax K;0 and the initial labor income tax L;0 remains ﬁxed and if
there is no debt (b =0 ), then a higher capital income tax rate K will unambiguously result in
a higher growth rate gt from period t  2 onwards.
Proof: This is a direct consequence of S(R;1) ==(1 + ) and equation (18), which
yields the growth rate g − 1=g t−1for t  2. 
We therefore conclude that this objection is not a serious one either. The analysis shows,
however, that it is important to raise initial revenue via labor income taxes rather than debt in
endogeneous growth frameworks like ours, if one is concerned about time-consistency issues
and high growth at the same time.
4.3 Objection 3: The Old Work Too
Finally, let us relax the condition that it is only the young who receive labor income (cmp.
Summers (1981)). Consider again the logarithmicexample, where the utility function is given
by (19). Unfortunately general results look rather messy. Consider the case, where the issue is
whether to marginally tax capital income or to marginally subsidize capital income. We have
the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose, the utility function is given by equation (19) and b =0 . Consider the
equilibrium, where K =0 . A marginal increase in the capital income tax rate will marginally









where IL =( 1− ) a−aγ is the after-tax labor income per unit of capital (or the after-tax
laborshare) and where IK = R = a+1−istheafter-taxcapital incomeper unitof capital.
Thus, the inequality (29)compares thepresently consumed fraction of future,discounted labor
income(whencapitalisnormalizedto oneunit)withtheratioofcapitalincometolaborincome
after taxes: as long as that fraction is not too high, a higher capital income tax will still lead to
faster growth.
14Note that there is no change in the resale value of the initialcapital stock due to a changed saving behaviour
by the ﬁrst young generation according to equation (8)13
Proof: Note, thatC(R)=1 = (1+) is constant. Substitutingequations (14) and(10) into
















Rewriting this yields the result. 
To evaluate the issue more directly, consider the following two tables. Each entry in these
tables lists ﬁrstly the derivative dg=dK and secondly the savings rate S(R;) as given in
equation(1). We choselog-utilities. For theparametersinour model we chosea =1 2 ,=: 3 ,
γ=: 2 ,=: 3 . For the ﬁrst table we chose  =1 , whereas we chose  = :5 for the second
table to evaluate the effect of a change in the discount factor. We varied both the parameter 
and the parameter K in each table. Note that the parameter  here corresponds closely to the
redistribution parameter  in Jones and Manuelli (1992), section 2, since in their model wage
income is negligible asymptotically. The parameter K implies a value for L via equation
(14), which is given as well.
When interpreting these tables one needs to keep in mind that the savings rate S(R;) as
givenbyequation(1)arethesavingsoftheyoungasafractionoftheirwealth,whilenetsavings
of the entire economy are found after subtracting the dissaving by the old. Thus, even high
values of S in these tables can be consistent with observed low savings rates. Furthermore,
negative savings rates S are incompatible with equilibrium, although they can be calculated
formally: they should therefore be read as indicating non existence of a steady state.14
Table 1
 =1 : 0  K= -10 % 0% 10 % 20 % 30 %
 L = 41 % 36 % 31 % 25 % 20 %
1.0 dg=dK = 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
S = 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.8 dg=dK = 1.25 1.14 1.00 0.82 0.58
S = 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37
0.6 dg=dK = 0.69 0.56 0.42 0.23 0.01
S = 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10
0.4 dg=dK = 0.33 0.24 0.13 0.00 -0.15
S = 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10
0.2 dg=dK = 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.12
S = 0.015 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03
0.0 dg=dK = 0 0 0 0 0
S = -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.1715
Table 2
 =0 : 5  K= -10 % 0% 10 % 20 % 30 %
 L = 41 % 36 % 31 % 25 % 20 %
1.0 dg=dK = 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43
S = 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
0.8 dg=dK = 0.75 0.66 0.55 0.41 0.23
S = 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22
0.6 dg=dK = 0.37 0.28 0.17 0.05 -0.11
S = 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11
0.4 dg=dK = 0.16 0.09 0.02 -0.06 -0.16
S = 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00
0.2 dg=dK = 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10
S = -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11
0.0 dg=dK = 0 0 0 0 0
S = -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 -0.2216
Itispossibletoﬁndparametercombinationsinthesetablesthatlookreasonableandproduce
adecreasein thegrowthratedueto an increaseinthecapitalincometax, whileat thesame time
keeping a positive savings rate for the young. For example, for  =1 : 0 ,=: 4and K = :3,
the derivative has the value −0:15, while the savings rate for the young is equal to 0:10.I t
is important to note, however, that the parameter ranges for which this occurs are somewhat
extreme in that they require either a rather high capital-income tax to begin with15 or a rather
lowfraction of earned incomewhen young. Moreimportantly,perhaps, theseranges arealso
rather fragile in the sense that savings rates are extremely low and more often negative rather
than positive for those table entries, where the derivative of the growth rate with respect to the
capital income tax rate is negative.
We therefore conclude that while this objection may be the most serious of the three, the
more robust result here is still the initial claim that a higher capital income tax will lead to
faster growth.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that a higher capital income tax rate means faster growth in two-period
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, where government expenditures are
a ﬁxed fraction of total GNP. In this model, a higher capital income tax means a lower labor
income tax, which leaves the presently young with morenet incomeout of which to save. This
in turn leads to faster growth.
We examined threeobjections against this argument and arguethat none of these objections
is serious enough. Firstly, while the effect may go the other way with sufﬁciently interest-
elasticsavings,wearguethatlongtermsavingsintheUSarenotelasticenoughforthereversal.
Secondly, even if initial capital is grandfathered in, our claimed effect holds, as long as the
labor income tax is lowered only in those periods in which additional revenue is generated
from higher capital income taxation, i.e. as long as lowered labor income taxes are not deﬁcit-
ﬁnanced. Thirdly, while our effect can be undone, if the old earn labor income too and while
it is true, that reasonable parameter values can deliver this, the range of parameters for which
a reversal of our effect happens is quite fragile.
We therefore conclude that a higher capital income tax leads to faster growth. We are
conﬁdent that the results can be generated also in richer models similar to those in Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), where the members of each generation live longer than just one period.
Whatisapparentlyneededforoureffectisthatanincreaseincapitalincometaxationconstitutes
a shift in the tax burden to the relatively older agents. That this is so in practice can be seen
from the calculations performed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991).
15Remember that K is the tax on the total capital income and that savings are out of after-tax labor income.17
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